NETLMM Security Threats on the MN-AR Interface

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New Terminology

- **MN authentication**: Initial authentication of MN for network-access authorization
- **MN identifier**: String based on which MN authentication can be accomplished
- **Data-origin verification**: Sender verification for IP packets sent by a MN for network-access and accounting purposes
- **Data-origin identifier** (formerly called a "per-packet identifier"): String/property based on which MN can be identified for data-origin verification of its IP packets
- **Locator**: Destination address of an IPv6 data packet (This is not a definition specific to NETLMM.)
- Thanks to Julien for raising the need for a better terminology
Roaming at a Victim's Costs

- Problem: Spoofed data-origin ID
  - Attacker sends packets on behalf of victim
  - Attacker roams at a victim's costs
  - After initial MN authentication
- Data-origin verification can prevent this
  - May have to be bound to initial MN authentication
  - Only in MN-2-CN direction
- External protection against bogus packets from malicious CN
Off-Path Eavesdropping

- Problem: Impersonation during DNA
  - Impersonator mimics victim during DNA
  - NETLMM redirects victim's packets to impersonator
  - $\Rightarrow$ eavesdropping from off the path

- Limitation: Impersonator cannot forward packets to MN if MN is on different link
  - because impersonator uses same IP address as MN
  - Different than in Mobile IPv6, where impersonator's "c/o address" differs from victim's "home address"
Denial of Service

- Problem: Impersonation during DNA
  - Similar to off-path eavesdropping,…
    - Misuse of DNA
    - Redirection of victim's packets
  - …but intended to cause DoS to victim
- Limitation: Attacker must redirect packets to itself
  - because NETLMM delivers packets to where a MN is believed to be seen
  - Again different than in Mobile IPv6
Threats to AR Functions

- Problem: Rouge AR acts as man in the middle
  - May eavesdrop on packets,
  - modify packets,
  - forward packets via a path outside NETLMM
- Limitation: Return packets go through NETLMM
  - Rouge AR may see return packets,
  - but may not be able to modify them
- But: Rouge AR may act as NAT box
Problem: Vulnerabilities of ND6/DNA
- Apply to NETLMM…
- …because NETLMM uses ND6/DNA
SeND can prevent some attacks
Location Privacy

- Problem: MN identifier associated w/ IP address
  - MN identifier leaks during MN authentication
  - Attacker associates identifier w/ IP address
  - Attacker then tracks victim's IP address

- Threat 1: Attacker on access link
  - Sends NS for victim
  - Address resolution or DAD

- Do ARs forward ND6 signaling to other links?
  - DAD requires this given that links have common prefix(es)
  - NA indicates that victim is inside NETLMM or on the same link
Location Privacy (2)

- Threat 2: Attacker btw. ARs and MAP
  - Attacker eavesdrops on NETLMM signaling
  - Most effective close to MAP
  - Encryption can prevent this
- Threat 3: IP address tells victim is inside NETLMM
  - Limitation: NETLMM prefix not very precise
  - Traceroute, too, may not produce meaningful information due to the MAP-AR tunnel
Some comments related to AR-MAP interface. This summary focuses on MN-AR interface.

Reviewers' Comments
Mailing List Discussion
Implicit Data-Origin Identifier

- Data-origin ID may not show up in packets
  - Can be port of switch,
  - frequency slot,
  - time slot, etc.
- Identified by Julien

- Data-origin ID can be MN-MAP security context
  - MN perceives all ARs as a single, "virtual" MAP
- Identified by Gerardo
Flooding Mobile Nodes

- Draft does not mention flooding of MN's IP address
  - Mentions only flooding of ARs or MAPs
- More dangerous for existing IP addresses
  - Bandwidth of MAP's Internet attachment
  - Routing-table look-up at MAP
  - Encapsulation at MAP (special in NETLMM)
  - Bandwidth w/in NETLMM domain
  - Decapsulation at AR (special in NETLMM)
  - Neighbor Cache look-up at AR
  - New Neighbor Cache entry at AR
  - ND6 signaling w/in access network
- Less dangerous for non-existing IP addresses
  - MAP discards packet after routing-table look-up
- Identified by Julien

See also RFC 3756, "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", section 4.3.2
IGP Security vs. NETLMM Security

- IGP security vs. NETLMM security unclear
  - Draft relates IGP security to NETLMM security, but…
    - routing protocol is hop-by-hop
    - NETLMM protocol is end-to-end (i.e., AR-to-MAP)
  - Clarify that in the draft
- Identified by Vidya